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Malone Dies and the Beckettian Mimesis of Inexistence
Abstract
In the novel, it is not so much that Malone dies as that a mimetic convention concerning the
representation of life is terminated or, more precisely, terminally minimalized. Through this reduction of
life, Beckettian mimesis is enabled to represent a mode of existence unencumbered by antecedent
associations or presuppositions. As the "axioms" (MD 187) and conventions regarding the significance of
life are debunked or decomposed, the mimesis of inexistence emerges. But as this state of inexis tence is
riddled with paradoxes, an intellectual device is required to facilitate analysis of it. The device in question
concerns what metaphysics terms "transcendentals," which determine how we experience what we
experience, and thus constrain the boundaries and possibilities of subjectivity. But far from mimicking the
method of transcendental phenomenology to uncover the functions by which structure is constituted or
filled in, Beckettian mimesis, as exemplified in Malone Dies, seeks instead to represent the process by
which structure and order are drained. The hallmark of Beckettian mimesis is the representation of the
process by which consciousness is emptied of the content which inexists in it. The deeper implications of
this remarkable evacuation can be explored by reference to the doctrine of the kenosis or evacuatio (selfemptying).
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In his study of narrative, Peter Brooks derives the convention of
plot from "the problem of temporality: man's time-boundedness,
his consciousness of existence within the limits of mortality" (xi).
As its title suggests, perhaps no novel is more unremittingly concerned with "existence within the limits of mortality" than Malone
Dies. From his first sentence, Malone, the eponymous first person narrator, foregrounds the inevitability of death: "I shall soon
be quite dead at last in spite of all" (179). But in narrating his own
elapsation ("My time is limited" 197), Malone replaces the convention of plot (which concerns a temporal sequence of events
tending toward some terminus or end) with the convention of
"programme" (269) whose function, unlike that of plot, is not
causal but diversionary: "While waiting I shall tell myself stories,
if I can" (180).' This shift from plot to programme has profound
implications. For human temporality or, in Brooks's phrase, "existence within the limits of mortality," is now "freed from all responsibility" (231) concerning action and consequence or "cause
and effect" (240) in life. In the Beckettian universe, as formulated in Malone Dies, the only valid or relevant concern is " [t]o be
dead .. and never have to die any more, from among the living"
(264). Here existence is construed as the state of "mortal tedium"
(217) endured while the subject "wait[s], before he die [s], for his
body to be dead" (198).
But the great paradox of Beckettian mimesis is that the obverse of its reduction of life to the waiting for death is the reduc.
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tion of death to the continuation of life: "There is naturally another possibility ... and that is that I am dead already and that all
continues more or less as when I was not" (219). Like the maxima
and minima in Beckett's analysis of Bruno ("The maxima and
minima of particular contraries are one and indifferent" [DBVJ
6] life and death ultimately coincide: "till you begin to wonder
if you have not died without knowing and gone to hell or been
born again into an even worse place than before" (MD 227). Like
Molloy's different "regions" which "gradually merge into one another" (Molloy 65), life and death, for Malone, lose their respective distinctness: "The truth is, if I did not feel myself dying, I
could well believe myself dead
(183). As Leslie Hill observes,
"Living and dying, like extremes, converge to erase all that may
have taken place between their confines. .." (101). Angela
Moorjani concurs: "Throughout the novel
it is uncertain
whether Malone awaits death or birth" (120). Hence, "existence
within the limits of mortality" (Brooks's phrase again) becomes
existence without the limits of mortality: "And there comes a time
when nothing more can happen and nobody can come and all is
ended but the waiting that knows itself in vain" (MD 241; emphasis
mine).
The result of this predicament is a detemporalizing of time,
wherein time continues but without the succession of before and
after which is its defining property: "And perhaps he has come to
that last stage of his instant when to live is to wander the last of the
living in the depths of an instant without bounds, where the light
never changes and the wrecks look all alike" (MD 233). Here, to
invoke formulations in How It Is, it is "the same instant always
everywhere" (HIT 112), an undifferentiated duration where "all
the various times before during after" (HIT 107) merge in the
same "vast tracts of time" (HIT 107), bereft of "subdivisions" (HIT
95). Similarly, the Unnamable, who can "understand nothing about
duration" (UN 407), observes that "the seconds must all be alike
." (UN 395). Malone expands this
and each one is infernal
notion of the relentless continuity of time to include the idea of
time continuing beyond the possibility of change proper to temporality: "And the ticking of an invisible alarm clock was as the
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voice of that silence which, like the dark, would one day triumph
too. And then all would be still and dark and all things at rest for
ever at last" (203). Here time itself becomes timeless, as if, to
invoke Vladimir's mot in Waiting for Godot, "Time has stopped"
(WFG 24). For there can be no more change in it, only a static
flux. In his reference to "the indestructible chaos of timeless
things," Molloy posits a kinetic version of the same condition
(Molloy 39).
As Malone observes, there are indeed deaths in Beckettian
fiction: "How many have I killed, hitting them on the head or
setting fire to them?" (236).2 But their result is not to end temporal existence, but simply to change the context of its interminable continuity: "Then it will be all over with the Murphys,
Merciers, Molloys, Morans and Malones, unless it goes on beyond
the grave" (236; emphasis mine). Yet, as the narrator of Texts For
Nothing suggests, in the Beckettian universe posthumous existence ultimately signifies, not the realm of the afterlife, but the
death already in life: "dead like the living" (TFN 91). On passing a
"graveyard," Moran makes a similar observation: "If only that were
the only perpetuity" (Molloy 174). At bottom, this death already
in life pertains, not to lack of life, but to either (a) lack of desire
for life (as in Molloy's "daily longing for the earth to swallow me
up" 80) or to (b) lack of clarity concerning why life must be endured, as in Macmann's quandary: "And without knowing exactly what his sin was he felt full well that living was not a sufficient atonement for it or that this atonement was in itself a sin,
calling for more atonement, and so on, as if there could be anything but life for the living" (239). But due to what Molloy calls
"the well-known mechanism of association" (48), life under these
conditions cannot be distinguished from posthumous punishment, as the Unnamable suggests: "I was given a pensum, at birth
perhaps, as a punishment for having been born perhaps ..." (310).3

Existence as Inexistence

This confusing of life and death ("It's vague, life and death" [225] )
is aggravated by the construing of death as birth, as when Malone
describes himself as "an old foetus" (225), straining toward "birth
Published by New Prairie Press
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into death" (283). But the difficulty of achieving birth into death
derives from the prior failure to achieve birth into life, as the
Unnamable indicates: "I alone am immortal, what can you expect, I can't get born
." (UN 383). Malone concurs: "I shall
never get born and therefore never get dead ..." (225). Hence, at
bottom, existence in the Beckettian universe entails a state of
"inexistence" exempt from both birth and death: "I exist, in the
pit of my inexistence ..." (TFN 91); "my inexistence in the eyes of
those who are not in the know, that is to say all mankind" (UN
344); "orgy of false being life in common brief shames I am not
dead to inexistence" (HIT 69). Malone construes this condition as
an indefinitely prolonged sojourn in "the great cunt of existence" (283). The Texts narrator provides a less vulgar formulations: "I'm dead and getting born, without having ended, helpless
to begin, that's my life" (TFN 119); "I am dead, but I never lived"
(TFN 130). The Unnamable offers a variation on this theme:
"Mahood I couldn't die. Worm will I ever get born? It's the same
problem" (UN 352).
In the Beckettian mimesis of human experience, the notion
of "inexistence," just invoked, progressively displaces the notions
of life and death. Thus Malone Dies unfolds a dual project. The
first is to bring Malone's life to an end through eventual death: "if
I succeed in my breathing my last" (235). The second is to debunk, through the narration of his dying, the "ballsaching poppycock about life and death" (225), and replace it with the notion of
that third mode of existence: "inexistence."4 In the course of this
project, life is deanimated ("they will be almost lifeless, like the
teller" [180] ), and death is vivified: "weary to death one is almost
resigned to-I was going to say to the immortality of the soul ..."
(229). In the novel, it is not so much that Malone dies as that a
mimetic convention concerning the representation of life is terminated or, more precisely, terminally minimalized.5 Through
this reduction of life, Beckettian mimesis is enabled to represent
a mode of existence unencumbered by antecedent associations
or presuppositions. Hence, the purpose of Malone's stories is not
merely, as noted earlier, to provide distraction "while waiting"
(180) for death: "That's the style, as if I still had time to kill"
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol27/iss2/8
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(248). The deeper purpose of Malone's stories is not to kill time
but to kill or dispose of the "axioms" (187) regarding purpose

and appropriate procedure entrained in conventional notions of
life and how to live it.'
Malone deploys a variety of devices by which to evacuate the
notion of life and thus to render accessible the "stratum" (226) of
inexistence. In narrating his own decline toward death, Malone
emphasizes the lifelessness of the period preceding it ("I have
lived in a kind of coma" [183] ), and then applies that same condition to everyone: "Coma is for the living" (194). He also undermines the notion of life by obscuring the transition from living
to dying: "As to the events that led up to my fainting and to which
I can hardly have been oblivious at the time, they have left no
discernible trace, on my mind" (183). Malone further obliterates
the significance of individual life by indicating that the only distinguishing factor in any life is the time required to end it: "Here
lies Malone at last, with the dates to give a faint idea of the time he
took to be excused and then to distinguish him from his namesakes, numerous in the island and beyond the grave" (271).
In Malone's stories of the Saposcats, the Lamberts, and
Macmann, the same depletion of life occurs. The adult Lamberts
are "grown men and women embedded deep in life" (199; emphasis mine)! But that life in which they are ensconced is founded
on futility: "At the same time angry unanswerable questions, such
as, What's the use? fell from her lips" (202). Similarly, the conventions of life pursued by the Saposcats succumb readily to a
reductio ad absurdum: "The life of the Saposcats was full of axioms, of which one at least established the criminal absurdity of a
garden without roses and with its paths and lawns uncared for"
(187). The result is another foregrounding of futility: "It was as
though the Saposcats drew the strength to live from the prospect
of their impotence" (188). The intervals of movement punctuating Macmann's habitual torpor complete the reduction of life to
rudimentary movement with merely functional value: "Because
in order not to die you must come and go, come and go, unless
you happen to have someone who brings you food wherever you
happen to be, like myself" (232). The same notion is later exPublished by New Prairie Press
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pressed in anal terms: "only rose again when the élan vital or
struggle for life began to prod him in the arse again" (243). In
How It Is, the spasmodic and exhausting movement of Born and
Pim across the vast tracts of mud, "right leg right arm push pull,"
is provoked by the identical stimulus: "stab him simply in the
arse" (HII 27, 71).

Transcendentals and the Mimesis of Inexistence
As the "axioms" (MD 187) and conventions regarding the significance of life are debunked or decomposed, the mimesis of inexistence emerges. But as this state of inexistence is riddled with

paradoxes, an intellectual device is required to facilitate our
analysis of it. The device in question concerns what metaphysics
calls "transcendentals." As Calvin Schrag indicates (with reference to Heidegger), these are defined as a priori and necessary
conditions of human experience: "The primary structures or
universal determinants of existence" (286). As "ontological structures of existence," transcendentals "are present in the concrete
existent, providing its very condition for being .." (Schrag 287,
289). As Ernst Cassirer indicates (with reference to Kant),
transcendentals are not of "empirical origin" (KLT 151). That is,
they are not derived from experience; instead, as Wilhelm
Windelband explains, "lying at the basis of all empirical perceptions," they determine how we experience what we experience,
and thus constrain the boundaries and possibilities of subjectivity (2: 539). Since, according to Schrag, the transcendentals, by
definition, concern "universal structures of human being as they
show themselves in the actualization of existence" (284), each
existent is thus, to invoke Paul Tillich, "the door to the deeper
levels of reality" which determine the essential form of human
"existence itself" (1.62).
There are, of course, many indications in Malone Dies of the
universality of the experience depicted: "for he was no more than
human, than the son and grandson and greatgrandson of humans"
(240-41); "you begin to fancy yourself the last of human kind"
(253); "it's only human" (268). But that experience is founded on
and discloses distinctly Beckettian transcendentals or "essentially
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol27/iss2/8
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necessary structures of experience" (Blackham 87) which redefine the meaning of human being. The transcendental emphasis
in Malone Dies-and indeed in the entire trilogy-appears in the
frequent references to the irrelevance and interchangeability of
particular experience. That is, all particular experiences merge
into and express the same unchanging and fundamental condition whose representation is the ultimate task of Beckettian mimesis: "The noises of nature, of mankind and even my own, were
all jumbled together in one and the same unbridled gibberish"
(207). Molloy affirms the same idea: "And wheresoever you wander, within its distant limits, things will always be the same, precisely" (Molloy 66). Through the representation of particular experiences, the Beckettian narrator intends to disclose the primary
structures or "laws of the mind" (Molloy 13) ordering-or disordering-all experience. In other words, the mimetic aim here in
representing distinct experiences is, to interpolate James Edie's
words from a different context, to "search for the ultimate, constitutive foundations of experience" (241) in Beckettian terms.
Many critics, of course, have noted the similarity between
Beckettian fiction and Husserl's phenomenology, which is founded
on the principle of transcendental reduction by which empirical
or sensory experience is reduced to its eidetic or formally strucis essentially prefigured"
turing components: "Everything
(Husserl, Ideas sect. 135).8 But our own concern here is not to
offer another phenomenological analysis of Beckett, but to use
the concept of transcendentals as a lens by which (if we may transpose Remy Kwant's phrase from a different context) "to disengage
the essential core from the accidental" (381) in the Beckettian
mimesis of experience. In this regard, one is reminded of Malone's
attempt to describe "the Stick, shorn of all its accidents" (254).
Perhaps the quintessential statement in Malone Dies concerning the transcendental project to disengage the essential core from
the accidental appears in Malone's dictum: "The forms are many
in which the unchanging seeks relief from its formlessness" (197).
In an alternate formulation of the same project, Malone emphasizes the relation between (a) the variant experiences narrated in
his stories and (b) the unchanging condition of their narrator:
.
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"Shall I be incapable, to the end, of lying on any other subject? I
feel the old dark gathering, the solitude preparing, by which I
know myself ..." (189). The transcendental project to disengage

the essential core from the accidental is further suggested by
Malone's ultimate enclosure of the external world inside a head
that is not his own: "You may say it is all in my head .. and that
these eight, no, six, these six planes that enclose me are of solid
bone. But thence to conclude the head is mine, no, never" (221).
That is, the basic concern of Beckettian mimesis, at the level now
under consideration, is to represent, neither particular objects
nor the particular subjects perceiving them, but instead the impersonal and primordial function by which their very conception
is constituted.
So far this sounds remarkably close to Paul Ricoeur's formulation of "transcendental" as that which pertains to "any attempt
at relating the conditions of the appearance of things to the structure of human subjectivity" (76). It also recalls Husserl's characterization of the transcendental standpoint as that which addresses
"how objective unities of every region and category 'are consciously constituted' " (Ideas sect. 86) by noetic or psychical processes whose operation is governed by universal principles. But,
as we shall now see, far from mimicking the method of transcendental phenomenology to uncover the functions by which structure is constituted or filled in, Beckettian mimesis, as exemplified in Malone Dies, seeks instead to represent the "peculiar logic"
(276) by which structure and order are drained and evacuated.
The result of these "gurgles of outflow" (287) is a drainage of
certainty, not a constitution of it. Whereas, according to Husserl,
the phenomenological method begins "in absolute poverty, with
an absolute lack of knowledge," and then proceeds "to genuine
knowing" (CM 2), Beckettian mimesis represents unremitting
"incomprehension" (UN 325), as evident, for example, in
Malone's "inability to grasp what order is meant": "For I have
never seen any sign of any, inside me or outside me (210).
Further-and very brief-reference to phenomenology will
enable us to clarify the implications of inexistence in Malone
Dies and elsewhere in Beckettian fiction, but in a way that contrahttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol27/iss2/8
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1560
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dicts the very principles by which phenomenology defines that
mode of being. Husserl developed phenomenology as the science
or logical study of the intrinsic and a priori structures of consciousness. The first principle in this regard is that consciousness
intends or is directed toward an object-something to be conscious of. As Joseph Kockelmans explains, "all consciousness is
consciousness-of-something ..." (32). Husserl elaborates: "Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word
intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito to bear within itself its cogitatum" (emphasis in
original; CM 33). For example, to invoke Franz Brentano, "in
judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love something is
loved, in hate something hated, in desire something desired, etc."
(50). Now, the mental being which an object has in the mind or
consciousness thinking or intending it is called inexistence, a term
which Husserl derived from Scholastic philosophy.' Thus, according to the phenomenological paradigm, consciousness exists only
if objects inexist in it.
Beckettian narration develops a spectacular reductio ad absurdum of this phenomenological paradigm where, according to
Quentin Lauer, " [t] o be is to be given to consciousness" or "to be
present in consciousness" (151). For in the Beckettian dispensation, the supreme object inexisting in consciousness concerns
the lack of objects: that is, the "void" (234) "absence" (222), or
"nothing" (192). But if, as Malone claims, "Nothing is more real
than nothing" (192) and the pre-eminent object of consciousness is therefore nothing, then consciousness itself cannot be distinguished from a "vacuum" (222): "in my head I suppose all was
streaming and emptying away as though through a sluice, to my
great joy, until finally nothing remained, either of Malone or of
the other" (224). That is, consciousness is no more than the site
where nothingness inexists. But without relation to objects
through intentionality or directedness toward them, consciousness itself loses its defining function. For in phenomenological
terms, as Edie notes, in virtue of "the strict correlativity of subject
and object in experience," consciousness is defined through its
Published by New Prairie Press
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relation to the objects toward which it is directed: "the subject is
constituted as subject only through its active involvement with
the world" (245). A consciousness in which nothing inexists cannot itself exist as consciousness. For it constitutes an "inverting
of] the natural order" (UN 388).
Malone, of course, dismisses the assumption regarding "the
strict correlativity of subject and object in experience" (Edie):
"the subject falls from the verb, and the object lands somewhere
in the void . ." (234); "I have to look long and fixedly and give
things time to travel the long road that lies between me and them"
(237). This dissociation of the terms (subject and object) on whose
relation the phenomenological notion of consciousness depends
is the indispensible first step by which Beckettian mimesis eventually represents a consciousness in which nothing inexists. The
project to covert conscious existence into the inexistence of nothing underpins the unrelenting self-consciousness displayed by
Malone: "All my senses are trained full on me, me" (186). Here,
Malone becomes the object of his own attention, and hence
inexists in it. Consistent with phenomenological practice, Malone
plans to define himself, through his long delayed "reckoning"
(181), as a consciousness of-that is, in terms of his relation to
the complete "inventory" (251) of objects in his possession: "For
only those things are mine the whereabouts of which I know well
enough to be able to lay hold of them, if necessary, that is the
definition I have adopted, to define my possessions" (249). But in
the course of his narrative, Malone loses many of the objects in
his possession and the stick with which he brings himself in relation to them: "I would hook the desired object and bring it over to
the bed ." (250). In becoming the object of his own attention
and thus inexisting in that attention, Malone progressively evacuates himself of all content. Hence, his inexistence in his own
attention becomes the inexistence of nothing: "never anything
there any more" (288).
Brief investigation of Malone's exercise-book will clarify the
implications of this predicament.1° At first, the book records the
object of consciousness (that which inexists in Malone's mind).
But then Malone's thinking undergoes a regress such that the
[
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object of thought becomes the fact that he has recorded his thought:
"I have just written, I fear I must have fallen, etc." (208). The
writing records the object of consciousness, but then itself becomes a secondary object of consciousness, while the original
object of consciousness becomes irretrievable: "That is not what I
said, I could swear to it, that is what I wrote" (209). This situation
anticipates that in The Unnamable where consciousness exists as
the awareness of a voice or articulating consciousness which it
repudiates ("It's not I" [UN 4101) but with which it is exclusively
concerned: "Ah if only this voice could stop, this meaningless
voice which prevents you from being nothing ..." (UN 370). That
is, consciousness exists through the inexistence in it of a prior
consciousness which is not its own but through awareness of which
it sustains a minimal being. In alternate formulation, the existence of a primary consciousness becomes inexistence in a secondary consciousness which is conscious only of "incomprehension" (UN 325) concerning it.

Provenance of the Mimesis of Inexistence
It is, of course, impossible to derive the Beckettian mimesis of
inexistence from any single factor or precursor. But in so far as
Beckettian inexistence concerns the absolute isolation of the object of consciousness from the subject in which it inheres or
inexists, one source involves Beckett's own early emphasis, in
"Bram Van Velde," on the breakdown of the relation between subject and object or "representer and representee" (BVV 125). The
same idea is expressed in a miscellaneous piece republished in
Disjecta, and applied to "The Waste Land":
The artist who is aware of this may state the space that intervenes
between him and the world of objects; he may state it as a noman's land, Hellespont or vacuum, according as he happens to
be feeling resentful, nostalgic or merely depressed. A picture by
Mr Jack Yeats, Mr Eliot's 'Waste Land,' are notable statements of
this kind. (D 70)

Significantly, Malone Dies does contain a passage which almost certainly alludes to the situation described in "The Fire SerPublished by New Prairie Press
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mon" section of "The Waste Land" (1922), concerning the "violet
hour, when the eyes and back / Turn upward from the desk, when
the human engine waits / Like a taxi throbbing waiting.... (Eliot
71). Malone's account emphasizes the sudden spasm of release
when office workers, "their long day ended" (229), pour into the
streets where " [f ]or an instant they cluster in a daze, huddled on
the sidewalk or in the gutter, then set off singly on their appointed
ways" (229-30). Eliot's comparison, in the typist seduction passage, of lustful expectancy to "a taxi throbbing waiting" is echoed-perhaps even parodied-by Malone: "Some even take a cab
to get more quickly to the rendez-vous or, when the fun is over,
home or to the hotel, where their comfortable bed is waiting for
them" (230). Moreover, the frequent testicular references in the
trilogy, epitomized by Malone's allusion to "this ballsaching poppycock about life and death" (225), can also-with some discrete
stretching-be related to "The Waste Land." For one of the myths
underpinning that work concerns the Fisher King, Anfortas, whose
land is blighted because of the wound in one of his testicles.
But, as we have seen, unlike "The Waste Land," whose mimetic project, according to Beckett, is to "state the space that intervenes between [the perceiver] and the world of objects," Malone
Dies withdraws entirely from that world of objects. Ultimately, in
a manner recalling the phenomenological epoche (abstention or
refraining from judgment), that outer world of objects is bracketed and left out of consideration, while the focus instead is trained
on inner experience and imagination: "You may say it is all in my
head" (221). Hence, the intervening space between subject and
object no longer matters. For concern with objective space has
been replaced by concern the subjective experience of time: "What
tedium" (187); "Mortal tedium" (217); "the waiting that knows
itself in vain" (241). In alternate formulation, concern with objective space is replaced by preoccupation with "all that inner
space one never sees
where thought and feeling dance their
sabbath
." (Molloy 10). The Unnamable elaborates: "How all
becomes clear and simple when one opens an eye on the within,
having of course previously exposed it to the without, in order to
benefit by the contrast" (UN 342-43). But inner experiencehttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol27/iss2/8
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what the Unnamable here terms "the within"-is itself
problematized by the condition of Beckettian inexistence whereby
consciousness is estranged from its own content which then improvises its own existence by obsessively repudiating the consciousness in which it inexists or inheres.
Inexistence and Kenosis
As we have shown, the hallmark of Beckettian mimesis is the
representation of the "psychological commotion" (UN 323) by
which consciousness is emptied of the content which inexists in
it. Moran describes a forerunner of this process: "Yes, I let them
spring within me and grow in strength, brighten and charm me
with a thousand fancies, and then I swept them away, with a great
disgusted sweep of all my being, I swept myself clean of them and

surveyed with satisfaction the void they had polluted" (Molloy 162).
The Unnamable refers to another: "if Mahood was telling the truth
when he represented me as rid at one glorious sweep of parents,
wife, and heirs" (UN 323). In Malone Dies, the locus classicus for
this evacuation is a passage we have already cited in a different
context: "in my head I suppose all was streaming and emptying
away as though through a sluice, to my great joy, until finally
nothing remained, either of Malone or of the other" (224). In
later Beckettian texts, such as The Unnamable, Texts For Nothing,
and How It Is ("I say it as I here it" [7] ), it becomes evident that,
once this drainage has occurred, the evacuated content of consciousness sustains its own rudimentary consciousness of the
consciousness from which it springs.
The deeper implications of this remarkable evacuation can
be explored by reference to the doctrine of the kenosis or evacuatio
(self-emptying), whereby, according to W.H.C. Frend, Christ "voluntarily divested himself of power in submitting to incarnation
for the purpose of conquering death and saving man" (210). The
doctrine, derived from 2 Cor. 8:9, is epitomized by Aquinas (here
quoting Augustine): "'He emptied Himself, taking the form of a
servant, that he might become a servant; yet did He not lose the
fulness of the form of God' " (ST III, 5, 1, ad. 2). Through kenosis, as
Aloys Grillmeier notes, Christ chose "a mode of existence which
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concealment of his proper being" (1.21). The purpose of
Christ's kenosis is to enable the salvation of man through awakening faith in the redemptive power of divine love.
Eventually, the Christological concept of kenosis was transposed to the human dimension in order to define religious morality in higher terms. Here the supreme moral project of the
individual, in achieving relationship with God, is to evacuate everything within that springs from or expresses the " [h]uman nature" (Molloy 35) which each individual shares in common with
all members of the species. As Vladimir Lossky explains, "the
perfection of the person consists in self-abandonment kenosis]"
by which everything within that pertains to the common human
nature is expunged, with the result that " [t] he person is free from
its nature, is not determined by it" (144, 122). In this liberated
state, as Lossky observes, "the person expresses itself most truly
in that it renounces to exist for itself," in terms of the drives imposed by human nature, and instead exists for God (144).
Precisely this kind of evacuation of human nature in the individual occurs in Molloy, when Moran repudiates his humanity
("I have been a man long enough, I shall not put up with it any
more"), and devotes his existence to heeding the inner voice which
now addresses him: "I was getting to know it better now, to understand what it wanted" (Molloy 175, 176). By the time the trilogy
reaches The Unnamable, the kenotic evacuation of human nature
associated with the audition of the voice includes, as we have seen,
the evacuation of the object of consciousness from the consciousness in which it inexists or resides. At this point, we reach an
undiscovered stratum of signification in Beckettian fiction. In
some way, in virtue of its kenotic associations, the celebrated disjunction of voice and narrator or consciousness and content has
redemptive properties, just as did the kenosis of Christ. Indeed,
Malone Dies, the fiction with which we are principally concerned,
abounds in allusions to Christ: (a) Macmann's question, "Why
two Christs?" (263), (b) Moll's sole remaining tooth carved "to
represent the celebrated sacrifice" (264), (c) the "stations" of Sapo's
early suffering in life (206), (d) the "crucifix" affixed to the chimney-piece in the Lamberts' home, and (e) Macmann's cruciform
is a
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posture in the rainstorm: "His hands at the ends of the long-outstretched arms clutched the grass, each hand a tuft, with as much
energy as if he had been spread-eagled against the face of a cliff"
(239).
There is no intention here of linking the notion of kenosis
with a devoutly Christian interpretation of Malone Dies in particular or Beckettian fiction in general." Indeed, Malone repudiates "the consolations of some religion or other" (248), and the
Unnamable mocks "belief in God" (UN 343). Moreover, the blasphemous strain in Beckett's art very early achieved notoriety, beginning with the attempt of the defense attorney, during the
Gogarty-Sinclair libel trial in 1937, to discredit Samuel Beckett
(witness for the plaintiff) by citing, according to James Knowlson,
a passage from More Pricks Than Kicks (published in 1934) as a
"blasphemous caricature of Jesus Christ" (DTF 279). A far more
vulgarly blasphemous example occurs in the defecation scene in
"First Love," where Beckett boldly oversteps the decorum displayed
by the Joycean narrator when describing Leopold Bloom's bowel
movement in the "Calypso" chapter of Ulysses:
At such times I never read, any more than at other times, never
gave way to revery or meditation, just gazed dully at the almanac
hanging from a nail before my eyes, with its chromo of a bearded
stripling in the midst of sheep, Jesus no doubt, parted the cheeks
with both hands and strained, heave! ho!, with the motions of
one tugging at an oar, and only one thought in my mind, to be
back in my room and flat on my back again. (FL 15)
As the above passage suggests, Beckettian fiction offers a scatological interpretation of kenosis or "evacuation" (UN 349), not a
Christian one. There's only "shit" (UN 365) in the head: "fucking
awful business this" (UN 282). The thoughts and feelings which
inexist in consciousness are to be evacuated (to borrow a phrase
from Watt) like a "hard stool" (W 251). That is perhaps the psychological origin of the mimetic kenosis we have examined, wherein
the Beckettian narrator (whether named or anonymous) is represented in terms of inexistence: in terms, that is, of an object of
consciousness, a swarm of thoughts, dissociated from the consciousness in which it inexists or resides.12 The primary Beckettian
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analogue of this predicament is that of words or voice dissociated
from the mouth from which they issue:
`There never was anything, never can be, life and death all nothing, that kind of thing, only a voice dreaming and droning on all
around, that is something, the voice that was once in your mouth.
(FAW 49)

The kenotic function of this "wordshit" (TFN 118) is to enable
the Beckettian narrator to empty himself of himself, to be himself
through the negation of himself ("It's not I" [UN 4061), so that his
pain will be suffered at one remove: "I'm far from all that wrangle"
(TFN 75); "I shall not speak of my sufferings. Cowering deep
down among them I feel nothing" (MD 186). Such is the purpose
of Beckettian inexistence. An alternate image for the process of
evacuation is vomiting: "I vomit, someone vomits, someone starts
vomiting again, that must be how it happens" (UN 409). But this
interpretation of kenosis in Beckett's fiction contradicts the
deconstructionist view, well epitomized by Daniel Katz, that
"Beckett's characters don't 'produce' thought as much as interpret, translate, and repeat the 'thought' to which they are subject"
(91). According to that view, "The moment of originary expression is always an echo" (Katz 92).

The Discrepant Aspects of Beckettian Mimesis

of awareness represented in Beckettian fiction and, more specifically, in
Malone Dies. On the one hand, as we have seen, there is the consciousness of silence or nothing: "Nothing is more real than nothing" (192); "And then all would be still and dark and all things at
rest for ever at last" (203). On the other hand, there is the consciousness of noise or distraction attributed to the object of consciousness which, through kenosis or evacuation, has been dissociated from the consciousness in which it properly inexists or
inheres: "Somewhere in this turmoil thought struggles on, it too
wide of the mark. It too seeks me, as it always has, where I am not
to be found" (186). These two poles, consciousness of nothing
(or silence) and consciousness of distraction (or noise) can be
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol27/iss2/8
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construed as correlative aspects of the same condition. Viewed in
terms of the evacuating agent, the consciousness of nothing pertains to the emptiness in consciousness which results from the
kenosis by which consciousness evacuates its own content. Viewed
in terms of the evacuated product, the consciousness of distraction pertains to the subjectivity attributed to the nexus of thought
which, through kenosis, has been expelled from the consciousness
whose object it is and of which it remains vestigially aware.
Beckettian narration tends to oscillate between these two
poles: the void resulting from evacuation and the perplexed subjectivity attributed to the evacuated content. But this mimetic
paradigm is complicated by a third factor-the ceaseless effort of
the evacuating consciousness to re-establish contact with its
evacuated content: "a voice like this, who can check it, it tries
everything, it's blind, it seeks me blindly, in the dark . ." (UN
410). Beckettian mimesis represents an almost Manichean
struggle in consciousness between the need to evacuate and the
need to accumulate, the need for awareness and the need for
oblivion-a conflict localized in Malone's celebrated exercisebook which records both consciousness and the gaps in consciousness: "I have spent two unforgettable days of which nothing will
(222)." As Malone suggests, it is the struggle
ever be known
between "the blessedness of absence" (222) and the need to grasp
"at last the true nature of absurd tribulations" (224).
.

.

.

.

Notes
1 Hill interprets Malone's notion of "play" as "'a regressive activity
having for him the same function it has perhaps for children [i.e.] a
means of exploring the limits between the fictional and the real, self
and other, order and disorder, identity and difference" (102).

For an early and cogent relating of Malone to previous Beckettian
narrators, see Hesla 105-06.
2

For a relating of Malone Dies to "the legacy left by Pilgrim's Progress
to the tradition of the English novel" with respect to "the inescapable
3
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inheritance of a death that
the line,' " see Thomas 385.

is

figured in literary terms as the 'end of

For a poststructuralist interpretation of Malone's mode of being as
"haecceity" or immanent existence (a term borrowed from Deleuze
and Guattari), see Uhlmann 120-24.
4

On the Beckettian tendency to undermine mimetic conventions, see
Moorjani: "Beckett's novels from Watt onward
undermine the
classic project of the novel to mirror outer and inner reality, the fiction of transparency" (45). On the tendency, in Malone Dies, to "end
the tradition of meticulous fictional editing that begins with
Richardson," see Abbott 126.
5

.

.

.

For a relating of Malone Dies to a critique of the Western notion of
"the progress of history," see Uhlmann 125.
6

7 Cohn observes that the name Lambert' was rendered as 'les Louis' in
Malone Meurt, and refers to Balzac's Louis Lambert (94).

For an application of Husserl to Beckett's Company, see Locate lli
162-66. For an application of the Husserlian device of "bracketting"
to Beckett's fiction, see Butler 78. Regarding Derrida's critique of
Husserl, see Trezise 10-13 and Uhlmann 166-69.
8

9 See

Brentano 50 and Kockelmans 32.

10 For the relation between Malone's exercise book and the exercise
book (now in the Humanities Research Center at Austin) in which
Beckett wrote the last pages of Watt and the first pages of L'Absent
(the original title of Malone Meurt), see Connor 70. The reference is to
Malone's comments about beginning his entry near the bottom of a
page already written on: "The first pages are covered with ciphers and
other symbols and diagrams, with here and there a brief phrase"
(Malone Dies 209). For a seminal discussion of Beckett's self-conscious art, see Copeland.
11 Cf. Hill on the topos of crucifixion in Beckett's fiction: "the sign of
an unsolved conundrum, as a paradigm for the strange impossibility
of joining word and flesh together in such a way as to give birth to a
speaking human subject in whom name and body share a common
bond of identity" (104).

12 For discussion of this paradox in terms of the Cartesian cogito and
cogitatum, see Levy 84-85. For the seminal discussion of the relation
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol27/iss2/8
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of Descartes to Beckett, see the famous chapter, "The Cartesian Centaur," in Kenner 117-32.
13 For applications of Manichean dualism to Beckett, see (a)
Knowlson 445; (b) Moorjani 124; and (c) Uhlmann 117-19.
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